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The Group of Eight (G8) leaders issued a statementfrom their summit in Kananaskis, Canada, on June27, 2002, announcing a new initiative to formal-
ize multilateral nonproliferation cooperation.2  Accord-
ing to the statement, the G8 nations will coordinate the
funding and implementation of projects to prevent ter-
rorists and other proliferators from acquiring nuclear,
chemical, radiological, and biological weapons; missiles;
and related materials, equipment, and technology.
Intended initially to direct projects toward Russia, the G8
Statement leaves open the possibility of expanding simi-
lar efforts in the future to other Newly Independent States
(NIS)of the former Soviet Union and possibly to other
regions of proliferation concern. In the statement, the G8
nations committed up to $20 billion to support such
projects over the next 10 years.
Since 1991, the United States has sponsored the
Nunn-Lugar threat reduction cooperation program to
assist the NIS to dismantle their weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD); secure their WMD materials, technology,
and expertise; and convert their WMD facilities to non-
military purposes. 3  While often considered a unique pro-
gram with a limited scope, Nunn-Lugar has matured into
a complex and comprehensive foreign policy and national
security mechanism. Throughout the 1990s, the European
Union (EU)—and to a lesser extent, Canada and Japan—
has provided nonproliferation assistance to Eastern
European and former Soviet states in parallel to the U.S.
Nunn-Lugar programs. However, EU, Canadian, and Japa-
nese efforts have historically been on a much smaller scale
and largely directed toward the human and environmen-
tal aspects of the Russian WMD demilitarization effort.
Moreover, the bilateral and multilateral agreements
established by the EU member states, Canada, and Japan
with Russia and the other NIS and Eastern European states
largely lacked the rights and protections provided by the
U.S.-NIS Nunn-Lugar agreements. In effect, therefore, the
G8 Global Partnership rejuvenates and provides poten-
tial new funding sources from the other industrialized
countries to expand and enhance the effectiveness of the
Nunn-Lugar cooperative security model, whose benefits
are recognized as universal by all involved.
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According to the U.S. State Department, the new G8
initiative was crafted in the environment following the
events of September 11, 2001, when a consensus emerged
that a terrorist group or outlaw state would be likely to
use weapons of mass destruction if they possessed them.
The United States did not pursue the partnership prima-
rily as a burden-sharing initiative. Although the U.S. gov-
ernment clearly welcomes the prospects of increased
nonproliferation funding from its G8 partners, the
burden-sharing aspect of the initiative was not empha-
sized during the pre-summit negotiations.4  Nonethe-
less, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security John Bolton made it a point to note
in his October 2002 testimony to a U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing on the G8 Partnership that
“The G7 members’ [i.e., the G8 minus Russia] commit-
ments should represent a fairer share of the responsibilities.”5
The G8 Statement provides six principles and nine
guidelines intended to facilitate implementation of the
nonproliferation assistance programs. All of the G7 coun-
tries have provided nonproliferation assistance to Russia
in the past, and each has encountered implementation
problems. Across the spectrum of problems the partners
have encountered, the United States has met the fewest.
Therefore, the specific language used in the statement
draws largely from existing clauses in the U.S.-Russian
Nunn-Lugar umbrella and implementing agreements.
These provisions reflect, in this context, a desire on the
part of the European, Canadian, and Japanese partners to
obtain similar rights and protections.
For the partnership to be successful, it should ensure
uniform application of the principles and guidelines.
Moreover, if the partnership is to be considered an
expansion of the U.S. Nunn-Lugar cooperative security
model, the more successful projects are likely to be bilat-
eral rather than multilateral, with solid coordination by
the partnership’s oversight body. This assertion is sup-
ported by past experience, where successful projects have
been those in which one donor state found a discrete
endeavor it could support that needed little multilateral
coordination. In addition, the G8 can increase the effec-
tiveness of the partnership by pushing for Russian Federal
Assembly approval of the principles and guidelines in
order to legitimize the program throughout the entire Rus-
sian government. Finally, U.S. leadership within the part-
nership should guide participants toward nonproliferation
objectives not currently addressed by existing U.S. programs.
Efforts to implement the partnership have already
begun. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov
met in August 2002 with Ambassador Linton Brooks,
Acting Administrator of the U.S. National Nuclear
Security Administration to discuss, among other topics,
preparations for implementation of the G8 Partnership.
The annual G8 cycle began in September 2002, and the
nonproliferation partnership will be a major agenda item
for 2002/2003. One effort within the first few months will
be to organize the G8 Partnership’s oversight body, to be
known as the Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG).
This report reviews the general and specific issues
surrounding the G8 Global Partnership. The first section
provides an overview of the partnership’s goals and
intentions. The report then reviews Russian reaction to
the G8 Statement. It also discusses past experiences with
multilateral threat reduction efforts and assesses the les-
sons that can be drawn from the U.S. Nunn-Lugar pro-
grams. The report analyzes several major issues that will
impact the implementation of the G8 Partnership and
reviews selected clauses of the G8 Statement. The report
concludes with some final observations, including rec-
ommendations that would enhance the partnership’s
opportunities for success.
OVERVIEW OF THE G8 PARTNERSHIP
Some are calling the G8 Partnership a “10 plus 10 over
10” agreement, referring to $10 billion from the interna-
tional community, plus $10 billion in already-planned U.S.
funding, over the next 10 years. The statement does not
commit Russia to any internationally accountable fund-
ing. Some observers and Nunn-Lugar managers were
optimistic initially that this new initiative from the G8
would bring more U.S. funding for current programs and
provide some impetus for an expansion into new areas, or
areas discussed previously with Russia but rejected. In
reality, the United States did not commit to any additional
funding beyond its current plans. The G8 Statement
itself says, “All funds disbursed or released after its
announcement would be included in the total of com-
mitted resources.”6  In fact, both unobligated and planned
funding will count toward the U.S. contribution. If the
United States maintains currently planned funding lev-
els—about $1 billion annually—it will fulfill its G8 com-
mitment without any adjustments. Presuming that the
U.S. sets its annual funding allocation at the $1 billion
target, and presuming that—as many analysts assert—the
proliferation threat stemming from the NIS has not been
sufficiently addressed, the promise of increased funding
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contributions from the European, Canadian, and Japanese
Partners offers an opportunity to enhance and even acceler-
ate realization of important nonproliferation objectives.
Those who drafted the G8 Statement drew heavily
on the existing U.S.-NIS Nunn-Lugar agreements. The
G8 Statement contains a detailed list of principles and
guidelines that extend many of the protective clauses
found in the Nunn-Lugar agreements to the broader G8
community. The G8 partners deliberately constructed the
guidelines to address not only the more contentious imple-
mentation issues encountered by the U.S.-Russian expe-
rience, but also to reflect the many bilateral experiences
of the other G8 countries in executing cooperative agree-
ments for preventing proliferation.
Each G8 Partner has its own set of national priorities.
Moreover, most of the partners have projects either
ongoing or under discussion. The European part-
ners, in particular, were not waiting for the G8 agree-
ment and would have moved ahead with existing or
planned nonproliferation assistance programs. However,
according to the U.S. State Department, these projects
would likely have been modest in comparison to the scope
of the new G8 Partnership.7
The guidelines include clauses providing participants
with the right to monitor and audit activities, exemption
from taxes and duties, protection against liability claims,
and privileges and immunities for donors. Several phrases
applied in the statement, such as “monitoring,” “trans-
parency measures,” and “adequate access for donor repre-
sentatives to work sites” are clearly intended to fill the
holes that have caused problems with the existing U.S.
Nunn-Lugar programs.
RUSSIAN REACTIONS
At the outset of negotiations within the G8, Russia was
not enthusiastic about the proposed nonproliferation ini-
tiative. The Russian government viewed the language in
the proposed G8 Statement to be constraining. However,
due to a strong desire on the part of Russian President
Vladimir Putin, the financial incentives promised by the
partnership, and the logic of the G7 argument, the Rus-
sian government came to understand through many
negotiating cycles that the partners were not ask-
ing for any new concessions. Rather, the intention of
the G8 Statement is to ensure uniformity for both donors
and recipients.8
Reactions from Russian officials to the G8 Partner-
ship have been mixed. On the one side, many opposition
figures are leveling the same criticisms at the initiative as
have been heard in the past regarding Nunn-Lugar. For
example, General (Retired) Leonid Ivashov, a former
Russian General Staff officer well-known for his skepti-
cism about Western motives, stated, “Russia is invited to
join, but we are treated like a beneficiary not as an equal.”
Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Russian Commu-
nist Party, asserted, “It is clear that the billions of dollars
to be allocated to Russia by Western countries are designed
to completely annihilate Russia’s nuclear missile shield.”
Political figures closer to the current Russian government,
however, see a benefit to internationalizing the current
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. Alexei
Arbatov, a prominent member of the Russian Duma,
indicated that this program would help Russia to focus
more of its attention on Europe and away from the United
States, thus limiting what some Russians view as an
increasingly U.S.-dominated, unipolar world.9
PAST EXPERIENCES WITH MULTILATERAL
COOPERATION
The G8 Statement calls for extensive multilateral coop-
eration with phrases such as “mutually agreed effective
monitoring,” “G8 will work in partnership, bilaterally and
multilaterally,” and “bilateral and multilateral project
implementation will be coordinated.” Past experience,
however, raises some concerns on several levels: overall
coordination, unintended side effects of programs, and
Russian priorities and concerns.
Recipient Billions of U.S. Dollars 
United States          10 
Canada 0.65 
United Kingdom            0.75 
Germany            1.5 
European Commission            1 
Japan (initially)            0.2 
Italy*            0.4 
Other pledges not yet publicly announced 
Total         15+ 
 
Sources: Except where noted, U.S. Department of State, Testimony of Under Secretary
Bolton to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 9, 2002; where noted by
(*), Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, Testimony of Executive
Director Kenneth Luongo to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 9, 2002.
TABLE 1
G8 FUNDING COMMITMENTS TO DATE
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Of course, there have been some successes with mul-
tilateral cooperation. Two of the primary reasons the G8
codified this new partnership was to give wider applica-
bility to many of the protections afforded to the United
States in its Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement with
Russia, and to build on those past successes. Examples of
how these concerns manifested themselves in the past and
measures that may be taken to mitigate these concerns in
the future are elaborated in the following sections.
Prior NATO Coordination Efforts
In the mid-1990s, several European countries started to
provide nuclear safety and security assistance to the NIS.
At the international level, the Europeans coordinated
their assistance through two fora: the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. NATO’s
involvement did not extend much beyond gathering
information from donor states and generating top-level
spreadsheets to track the assistance. Although NATO dis-
continued its coordination effort after a couple of years,
the donors did gain experience working to coordinate their
assistance efforts.
European assistance tracked by NATO included emer-
gency response equipment, nuclear warhead transportation
security, defense conversion activities, fissile material con-
trol assistance, and retiring military officer assistance (such
as housing and retraining). Although Germany provided
substantial funding to move Soviet officers out of the former
East Germany, most European projects were minor and
restricted to limited, discrete objectives.
Prior European Union Coordination Efforts
The EU internal coordination effort, however, has been
more formal and more extensive than the NATO
endeavor. On December 17, 1999, the EU established a
Cooperation Program for Non-Proliferation and Disarma-
ment in the Russian Federation, within the framework of
the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.10  Under
that action, the EU allocated 8.9 million euros ($8.8 mil-
lion) for a set of studies on plutonium transport, storage,
and disposition, and for initial support to a chemical weap-
ons pilot destruction plant situated in Gorny, Saratov
Oblast. The EU plan would suspend the program if the
Russian Federation failed to cooperate fully with the imple-
mentation of the program, or failed to allow EU monitor-
ing and/or periodic external evaluations and audits.
Most European contributions to multilateral efforts
in the nuclear safety area are channeled through the EU
Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (TACIS) nuclear safety programs. TACIS is
the EU assistance program to the partner states in East-
ern Europe and Central Asia. Through transfer of know-
how, TACIS aims at assisting the partner countries in their
reform process to market economy and democracy, pri-
marily through grant assistance. According to the TACIS
Information Center, since its launch in 1991 through the
end of 1999, the program has committed some 6 billion
euros($5.9 billon). The European Commission, however,
reports that of that total amount, only 155 million
euros ($154 million) in TACIS funding was allocated to
Russia for nuclear safety efforts between 1997 and 2001,
with a total of approximately 300 million euros ($298 mil-
lion) allocated between 1991 and 2001.11  For 2000-2006,
3.1 billion euros ($3 billion) have been allocated. As one
European analyst observed, the objectives of this period
are “based on an understanding that cooperation is a
reciprocal process. Tendencies are toward increased coop-
eration and more coordination with other donors. This
should provide an opening for increased coordination
with U.S. support to Russian nuclear disarmament.”12
To further support Russia’s pursuit of a safe and en-
vironmentally sound dismantlement or reconversion
of infrastructure, equipment, and scientific capabilities
linked to weapons of mass destruction, the EU decided in
2001 to provide 6.08 million euros ($6.04 million) to fund
several project areas.13  According to a Council Decision
of June 25, 2001, implementing Joint Action 1999/878/
CFSP with a view to contributing to the European Union
Program Millions of Euros 
Nuclear Weapons Destruction 309 
Stabilization/Re-conversion of Experts 115 
Chemical Weapons Destruction   88 
Control of Nonproliferation   34 
Re-conversion of Facilities     4 
Total 550 
 
Source : European Commission; IP/01/329 - Brussels, March 7, 2001
TABLE 2
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Cooperation Programme for Non-Proliferation and Dis-
armament in the Russian Federation (2001/493/CFSP),
the EU plans to provide:14
• Support to the Russian Nuclear Safety Authority
(Gosatomnadzor) for developing the regulatory basis
and documents for the disposition of weapons-grade
plutonium
• Support for studies and experimental studies for mixed
oxides fuel (MOX) demonstration and licensing
• A cooperative feasibility study for immobilization of
Russian waste containing weapons-grade plutonium
• Support to the Russian Ammunition Agency (RMA)
to fulfill the Russian Federation’s responsibilities
under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
• Support for infrastructure building related to the
destruction of nerve gases stored at the Shchuchye
site.
The last point is discussed in greater detail below. It is
interesting to note here, though, that much of the EU
assistance program for Russian CW destruction is designed
around project areas in which the U.S. is precluded by law
from participating. The U.S. Congress, moreover, has
precluded all Nunn-Lugar programs from providing
infrastructure-building support, contending that such
activities are peripheral to the central U.S. national
security objective and should be provided by the
recipient government—Russia in this case. Ongoing and
augmented EU support to the Shchuchye CW destruction
site, in fact, was largely in response to the suspension of
funding from the U.S. by Congress in 1999. Thus, as
discussed further elsewhere in this report, multilateral
nonproliferation cooperation had already been taking
place long before the G8 established a formal process.
Prior Group of Seven Coordination
Coordination through the G8 (known as the G7 before
Russia’s accession) is not without precedent. Largely in
response to the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, the G7 initiated
a program of multilateral nuclear safety assistance at its
1992 Munich Summit. Since then, European multilateral
and bilateral assistance has focused on technical upgrades
and advice, improvements in reactor operations and emer-
gency procedures, and enhancement of regulatory regimes.
At a 1996 G7+1 Nuclear Safety and Security Sum-
mit, the participants agreed that, “National efforts have
been made in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the Newly Independent States to improve
nuclear safety levels, often in cooperation with multilat-
eral and bilateral programmes [sic]. In this regard,
we acknowledge these important efforts to upgrade reac-
tor safety and improve safety culture, but note that fur-
ther substantial progress is still required. We reaffirm our
commitment to cooperate fully for this purpose.”15  Dur-
ing this session, the G7 acknowledged the cooperative
programs of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States with
Russia for the safe storage and the peaceful uses of fis-
sile material released by the dismantlement of nuclear
weapons, and their safe and secure transportation for that
purpose. The 1996 Summit, held in Moscow, was intended
to coordinate the national activities and priorities of the
G7+1 states in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. The participants agreed on a framework of gen-
eral goals and objectives covering a range of nuclear
energy-related topics, including the safety of civilian
nuclear reactors; nuclear liability; energy sector strate-
gies in transition countries; nuclear waste management;
ocean dumping; nuclear material safety; illicit trafficking
in nuclear material; nuclear material accounting, control,
and physical protection; and safe and effective manage-
ment of fissile material designated as no longer required
for defense purposes.
Britain’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI),
for example, coordinates U.K. policies and activities in
this area and manages U.K. contributions to international
assistance programs. Currently, DTI is responsible for
managing a new three-year, 85 million pound ($132 mil-
lion) program of assistance to address the wide range of
Year Millions of Euros 
1997                 34 
1998                 17 
1999                 12 
2000                 33 
2001     19 
Total               115 
 Source : European Commission
TABLE 3
TACIS FUNDS ALLOCATIONS TO RUSSIA FOR NUCLEAR
SAFETY
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nuclear safety and security problems faced by the states of
the NIS. The U.K. has also contributed 18.25 million
pounds ($28.32 million) to the Nuclear Safety Account,
managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, which funds short-term plant safety
upgrades at some of the earliest Soviet design reactors still
in operation.
As opposed to the approximately $7 billion allocated
to Nunn-Lugar by the United States since 1992, the
remaining G7 members have provided in total less than
$1 billion. Although many donor countries have been
willing to allocate additional nonproliferation funding,
some have been unable to establish acceptable govern-
ment-to-government implementing agreements that
would provide liability protections, tax exemptions, and
transparency measures. As U.S. Under Secretary of State
Bolton stated, “Millions of dollars previously committed
by G8 members remain unexpended at present due to
these problems, and G8 members will have difficulty com-
mitting new funds if these difficulties persist.”16
CASE STUDIES FROM THE U.S. COOPERATIVE
THREAT REDUCTION EXPERIENCE
Since 1991, the U.S. Nunn-Lugar program has matured
from a relatively modest program managed by a single U.S.
government agency to a complex effort managed by mul-
tiple U.S. government agencies working in cooperation
with a multitude of foreign government agencies in each
of several countries throughout the NIS. This growth has
been an evolutionary process, as the U.S. Departments of
Commerce, Energy, State, and others have assumed
direct authority and appropriations for projects once man-
aged by the Department of Defense (DoD). Many of the
lessons to be learned from these experiences, including
internal coordination problems, openness and access
issues, and taxation and liability challenges were directly
addressed by the G8 Statement. There are additional
lessons from prior U.S. attempts at coordination with its
European, Canadian, and Japanese partners that should
be considered as the G8 implements the global nonpro-
liferation partnership. Described below are several cases
from DoD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program.
Emergency Response
Despite the unqualified success of some projects, others
failed to produce positive results because of such prob-
lems as the lack of interoperability of equipment. For
example, in the mid-1990s, a U.S. CTR team conducted
an audit and examination of emergency response (ER)
equipment provided to the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy (Minatom). While checking the equipment in a
warehouse outside of Moscow, the Minatom escort
offered to show the DoD team similar equipment pro-
vided by several European donors. The Minatom escort
opened several doors around the central warehouse hold-
ing area to reveal ER equipment from Germany, Italy, and
Britain. Although it was all viable equipment, none of it
was interoperable. The Minatom escort correctly
observed that it is expensive and inefficient to train troops
to use four different types of protective clothing, for
example, so much of the equipment went unused.
History may already be repeating itself. In 2002 prior
to the G8 Summit, several NATO countries approached
Russia with offers of assistance. Russia returned a request
for emergency response equipment, perhaps because such
equipment would be relatively simple to negotiate and
would require few, if any, intrusive audit measures by the
NATO donors. A U.S. government official knowledge-
able of the historical experiences described above is con-
sulting with the involved NATO partners, and has
expressed concerns similar to those outlined here.
Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility
Another example from the U.S. Nunn-Lugar experience
demonstrates the difficulty in attempting to coordinate
complex construction projects on a multilateral level. In
the mid-1990s, Japan approached the United States with
its desire to provide $30 million of threat reduction assis-
tance to Russia. Japan did not want its assistance to con-
flict with ongoing U.S. programs, so it asked the United
States to help coordinate its contribution. The United
States suggested that Japanese funding could best support
the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, which will
store plutonium removed from dismantled nuclear weap-
ons. The two donors approached Minatom with this pro-
posal. Minatom listened to the Japanese offer, but did not
propose a particular section of the Mayak building that
could be designated as Japan’s contribution. Instead,
Minatom raised some objections to Japanese participa-
tion in the Mayak project, citing technical coordination
issues and concerns about Japan’s status as a non-nuclear
weapon state. There may also have been other extenuat-
ing reasons behind the Russian stance. In any event, after
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Shchuchye Chemical Weapons Destruction
Facility
One CTR program with significant experience in build-
ing multilateral cooperative assistance is the Chemical
Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) at Shchuchye.
CTR program managers have expended considerable
efforts in the major European capitals generating support
for the CWDF. In particular, DoD envisions international
contributions not only for the design and construction of
the facility, but also the Russian-mandated social infra-
structure—which Russia has struggled to provide and
which the United States is precluded from funding by law.
Although the Bush administration’s strategic review of
threat reduction programs, conducted by the National
Security Council (NSC) in 2001, recommended acceler-
ated implementation of the CWDF, Congressional sup-
port has been problematic. This is because many in the
U.S. Congress have viewed the CW problem as a local
Russian environmental problem and not a strategic threat
to the United States.17  Without U.S. leadership, the
Europeans appear unwilling to forge ahead. This is con-
firmed to some extent by the EU documents cited else-
where in this report, which defer heavily to U.S.
Congressional funding constraints and U.S. administra-
tion implementation decisions.
To date, eleven countries, including the United
States, have either provided CWDF assistance, have
allocated funding to do so, or are considering such provi-
sions. Italy is constructing a gas pipeline, Canada and the
United Kingdom are helping with the design and con-
struction of power supply systems, and Norway is provid-
ing facility construction assistance. The European Union,
Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and the Nether-
lands are also contributing to CW destruction in Russia.
Approximately 90 percent of the funding needed to
construct the Shchuchye facility is slated to come from
the United States, with the remainder from the states listed
above and Russia itself. In 1999, however, Congress froze
U.S. participation in the program based on concerns that
the CWDF would not be able to meet its objectives.
Russia met many of the conditions set by Congress, and
U.S. assistance has subsequently resumed.18  While the
CWDF has yet to be built, and the proposed facility’s CW
destruction capacity remains contentious, the effort that
has gone into multilateralizing the project might serve as
an example for the G8. That is, although the donor states
have combined their resources to construct a single facil-
ity, each has found a niche aspect to which it can contrib-
ute and independently manage. Furthermore, the lessons
learned through the initial efforts to coordinate among
the donor states should provide valuable insights for the
G8 Partnership. The Russian Munitions Agency itself
states that, “The statement of the leaders of G8 on global
partnership against spread of armament and materials of
mass destruction, made in Kananaskis, undoubtedly will
give the novel impulse to the chemical disarmament. This
historic statement signifies a new stage, the outstand-
ing feature of which is the awareness by the world com-
munity, that the quickest disposal of chemical weapons is
a general objective.”19
Moscow and Kiev Science and Technology
Centers
Another example of multilateral cooperation is the sci-
ence and technology center model—the International
Science and Technology Center (ISTC)20  in Russia and
the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU).21
Established in 1992 and 1993, respectively, both centers
administer collective efforts by member states to engage
weapons scientists throughout the NIS. Managed on the
U.S. side by the State Department, donor participants
include the United States, the European Union, Japan,
Canada, Sweden, Norway, and the Republic of Korea. A
governing board at each center, consisting of member rep-
resentatives, builds consensus approval for funding
activities, but members also retain broad national discre-
tion in project funding and other programmatic decisions,
according to the State Department.
Between 1993 and 2000, EU support to science and
technology cooperation has amounted to about 185 mil-
lion euros ($183 million), enabling some 45,000 Russian
scientists to be involved in EU-funded programs. Accord-
ing to the European Commission, TACIS has contributed
about 100 million euros ($99.7 million), mostly through
the ISTC. The EU reached a Science and Technology
Agreement with Russia in May 2001 to improve the
access of Russian scientists to European programs and
ensure EU scientists a reciprocal access to Russian research
projects. Technical assistance will support the commer-
cialization of Russian research results and the develop-
ment of related small- and medium-sized businesses.
The centers’ long-term goals are to redirect weapon
science expertise away from WMD activities and toward
commercial endeavors. These endeavors are designed to
support transitions to market economies, create partner-
ships with foreign industries, and integrate scientists into
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the international community. While critics question the
success of the program, the science and technology cen-
ter model may serve as a starting point for collaborative
G8 Partnership endeavors.
Like the CWDF project described above, and the
broader Nunn-Lugar and other foreign nonproliferation
assistance programs in Russia, the ISTC has encountered
many political and bureaucratic problems.22  Common
themes include the lack of Russian Federal Assembly rati-
fication of the ISTC agreement, tax exemption problems,
accusations from Russia that the project aimed to buy
Russian knowledge and technology at below market
prices, and customs difficulties. Since project proposals
must be reviewed by a multilateral government body, the
ISTC/STCU model has been further criticized for taking
too long to issue decisions on grant applications. Perhaps
most serious are accusations that ISTC/STCU funding
allows scientists to continue with their weapons-related
activities while fulfilling their commercial contracts.23
Nonetheless, the centers have engaged tens of thou-
sands of former weapons scientists in a wide range of sci-
entific areas. Just as valuable lessons were learned during
the CWDF international coordination process, the expe-
riences gained from creating, managing, and sustaining a
multilateral governing body—one that is expected to
address the national priorities of several member states—
should be useful as the G8 embarks on its new initiative.
MAJOR ISSUES THAT WILL IMPACT G8
PARTNERSHIP IMPLEMENTATION
Based on more than a decade of experience, the United
States and its G8 partners have encountered a number of
issues that have affected implementation of the interna-
tional nonproliferation programs. The G8 nonprolifera-
tion partnership will need to address these issues if its
efforts are to prove successful.
Access/Transparency
Perhaps the single most influential determinant of suc-
cess for previous and existing U.S. Nunn-Lugar projects
in Russia is transparency, sometimes referred to as access
or openness. One of the immutable realities of the inter-
national nonproliferation assistance programs is their one-
sided nature: Donors require transparency into the work
they are funding in order to assure their taxpayers that
the funds are used for their intended purposes. Unlike for-
mal, negotiated arms control agreements, there are no
built-in provisions for mutual, reciprocal inspections. It
is unclear to what extent the absence of formal reciprocal
access requirements has affected Russia’s reluctance to
grant foreign visits to its sensitive sites. Many analysts have
warned that donor states should not seek to buy access
through assistance programs, and that openness on a
reciprocal basis is the only equitable solution. The offer
of informal visits of Russian experts to sensitive facilities
in the G7 Partner countries might help to placate
Russian apprehension on this issue.
Of course, when transparency is a non-issue, or when
access is routine and reliable, there is little question of
Nunn-Lugar’s effectiveness. For example, these concerns
are non-issues when the U.S. is procuring equipment out-
side of Russia or at joint centers such as the ISTC. More-
over, access to sites considered sensitive has become
routine under DoD CTR’s Strategic Offensive Arms
Elimination (SOAE) program. SOAE benefits from the
foreign access legalized by the ratification of the 1991
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I. However,
for programs where the United States has had little or no
access to the work sites, or where the exchange of sensi-
tive information has been problematic, the assistance
efforts have met with considerably less success. This has
been the case for the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s)
attempts to provide warhead dismantlement assistance to
Minatom and DoD’s attempts to provide nuclear
warhead security assistance at Russian Ministry of
Defense (MOD) storage sites.
An important aspect of Russian bureaucratic reluc-
tance to grant access to sensitive facilities may be the
political risks incurred by senior ministerial officials and
facility managers. That is, those who are in charge of the
facilities may be concerned that, once foreign access is
granted, political sentiments might change and they would
be left unprotected. Therefore, it is crucial that top levels
of the Russian government—the president and the prime
minister, specifically—guarantee the political cover of
those authorized to grant foreign access. This scenario, in
fact, appears to have opened the door for DoD to begin
implementing security enhancements at Russian MOD
nuclear weapon storage facilities.
On May 24, 2002, the United States and Russia
entered into the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(also known as the Moscow Treaty).24  It limits the parties
to the deployment of 1,700-2,200 nuclear warheads by
December 31, 2012. Unlike the Moscow Treaty’s prede-
cessors, however, it does not include extensive verifica-
tion measures and transparency protocols. Although
comprehensive warhead inventory accounting provi-
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sions—including weapons both deployed and in storage
and fissile material removed from warheads—were envi-
sioned by previous presidential summit declarations, this
most recent treaty will rely for the time being on the veri-
fication regime established by START I.
Many arms control proponents consider the Moscow
Treaty to be a lost opportunity. That is, it neither pro-
vided the means for conducting mutual and reciprocal
comprehensive warhead and fissile material inventory
accounting, nor did it address short-range, or tactical
nuclear weapons. Although the G8 Global Partnership
cannot provide the strategic stability foundation of
mutual reciprocal inspections, it has the potential to fill
at least part of that void. U.S. Senator Richard Lugar
explained this potential role as follows:
Through the Nunn-Lugar program, the United States
could maintain a window of observation into Russian
dismantlement, as well as serve as a venue to provide
Russia with an understanding and view of American
reductions. It would not be capable of completely
replacing a treaty verification regime, but it would be
tremendously valuable tool. In addition to the utiliza-
tion of national technical means, Pentagon contract
inspection and acceptance visits as well as audit and
examination visits could provide an effective verifica-
tion tool. Anyone who has witnessed the contractual
negotiating process involved in undertaking and imple-
menting a Nunn-Lugar project as well as the role of
American firms in managing such projects on site and
the auditing practices to ensure proper utilization of U.S.
funds, can attest that the inspection and verification
procedures associated with the program are every bit
as stringent and intrusive as similar measures under an
arms control regime.25
As pointed out earlier, this line of argument does not
address Russia’s concerns over mutuality and reciprocity.
It also lends further credence to arguments from Russia
that Western donors are simply trying to purchase access
to Russia’s most sensitive facilities. Although it is unlikely
that the United States or any of the other G7 donor states
would be willing to build formal inspections of their own
facilities into the threat reduction cooperation agree-
ments—and it does not seem appropriate either—there
may be one exception. Traditionally, the military-to-
military contacts element of the DoD CTR program has
been allocated to the U.S. military regional and functional
commanders-in-chief, allowing them to fund exchange
programs with NIS counterparts. This may be a venue
through which senior Russian officials could visit U.S.
installations and observe operations related to the dis-
mantling of WMD in the guise of a confidence building
measure. In any case, an effective partnership with Russia
must be predicated on transparency in both directions.
Taxation
Guideline V includes a promising feature of the G8 State-
ment. One fundamental reason why the tax issue contin-
ues to plague the U.S.-Russia threat reduction programs
is that, after the Russian Federation signed the original
Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement in 1992, the Russian
Duma passed a law requiring agreements that addressed
taxation be approved by the legislature. This provided an
opening for Russian agencies with taxation authority to
try to tax U.S. dismantlement and nonproliferation assis-
tance. When Russian federal, regional, and local agen-
cies become involved in the activities of the U.S.
Nunn-Lugar programs, they do not feel bound or com-
pelled by the umbrella and implementing agreements, and
are therefore often unwilling to step outside their stan-
dard bureaucratic operating procedures.
The following is a partial list of typical problems
caused by the taxation issue:
• Donor equipment is delayed in Russian entry ports
when the shippers claim exemption from customs
duties.
• United States firms seeking to conduct business
operations in Russia are denied permits when they
claim tax exemptions.
• Russian firms are unable to fulfill contracted or sub-
contracted work when they claim exemption from
paying income taxes.
These problems routinely cause project implementation
delays, often for months. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow issues
pro forma tax exemption support letters to CTR
contractors, but the letters may be ignored, or the Russian
agency in question may take its time confirming the
letters’ legitimacy.
Contractors, U.S. Embassy attorneys, and Nunn-
Lugar policy officials have met often with the various
Russian agencies, and in particular, the Russian Tax
Inspectorate. The basis of the Tax Inspectorate’s consis-
tent denial that the tax exemption claimed under the
umbrella agreement was valid is that the original umbrella
agreement was never submitted for Federal Assembly con-
sent. As a government-to-government joint threat reduc-
tion program, Nunn-Lugar was never intended to function
as a treaty. The sides were expected to conduct the threat
reduction activities in an environment of cooperation. It
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was not until the United States and Russia signed the pro-
tocols in 1999, which included additional clauses for taxa-
tion and other provisions, did Russia submit the umbrella
agreement to the Federal Assembly for concurrence. As a
result, as described below, there has been some recent
progress on this issue.
Debt for Nonproliferation
One idea that has become increasingly popular in recent
years, particularly in the U.S. Congress, would exchange
Russia’s foreign financial debt for a concurrent and equiva-
lent Russian nonproliferation budget increase. This
notion has proponents in Europe and Japan as well as the
United States, and is likely to pick up momentum given
U.S. leadership. In fact, the Kananaskis G8 Statement
directly references the debt-for-nonproliferation program
option as one method donors may use to fulfill their
funding commitments.
On September 30, 2002, President Bush signed into
law the Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonpro-
liferation Act of 2002. This act establishes “debt for non-
proliferation swaps” and is modeled on past successful debt
reductions for environmental protection efforts. Through
the swaps, the U.S. Treasury Department would restruc-
ture part of Russia’s debt to the United States. In exchange,
Russia would further its work on joint nonproliferation
programs that safeguard Russian nuclear materials, main-
tain effective export controls, dismantle Russian nuclear
facilities, and help unemployed nuclear scientists find
work other than with nations and terrorist organizations
seeking to build their own nuclear arsenals.26
In 2003, Russia will confront a large increase in
interest payments on its foreign debt. According to a draft
federal budget submitted to the Duma, Russia’s foreign
state debt is expected to be $124.5 billion, including a
debt of $52.7 billion to foreign governments. The
Russian Finance Ministry reported that foreign debt pay-
ments would reach $17.3 billion by 2003. In 2001, Russia
attempted to reschedule billions of dollars of foreign debt,
but the negotiations failed, and Russia went ahead with
the required payments. Germany is Russia’s major credi-
tor, with Russian debt to Germany totaling $18.6 billion.
As of January 1, 2003, Russia will owe $5.5 billion to Italy,
$3.8 billion to the United States, $3.7 billion to Japan,
$3 billion to France, $1.7 billion to Canada, $2.6 billion
to Austria, and $1.4 billion to Britain. Russia’s other credi-
tors include Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Finland, Switzerland,
and Sweden.27
However, Russians have expressed some concern
about a debt swap scheme. They worry that any debt for-
giveness, as it appears to creditors, may have an adverse
affect on Russia’s international credit rating. The Russian
Finance Ministry would become involved in any debt
swap discussions and may ultimately prefer to pay its debt
rather than receive debt reduction in order to shift fund-
ing into nonproliferation activities. It appears that
Russia will be able to pay these debts, assuming it reaches
its third consecutive surplus budget as planned. The bud-
get anticipates revenues to top about 2.4 trillion rubles
($75 billion) and expenditures of approximately 2.3 tril-
lion rubles ($72 billion).28  “If Russia manages to pass the
peak, confidence in our country will grow a lot,” Deputy
Finance Minister Kudrin said, according to ITAR-TASS
news agency.29
Some analysts in the U.S. believe that a debt-for-
nonproliferation program would provide a new source of
funding for Russian WMD threat reduction. In fact, it may
result in a net loss of funding. First, the Bush administra-
tion and the U.S. Congress are likely to view the $1 billion-
per-year commitment under the G8 Partnership as an
overall marker for budget planning. Given that the U.S.
has already budgeted this amount for NIS threat reduc-
tion, any debt forgiven may require an equivalent budget
reduction. For example, if  Russia pledged to increase fund-
ing for fissile material security in exchange for an equiva-
lent U.S. debt reduction, Congress might reduce DOE’s
budget in that area. At this point, the details have not
been worked out and these concerns are speculative. How-
ever, it is likely that many European countries, Canada,
and Japan will consider seriously the debt swap program
and count it toward their G8 Partnership contribution.
In any case, there is no universal consensus on pursuing
debt for nonproliferation, and any such initiatives will be
based on national decisions.
Unaddressed Proliferation Threats
Perhaps the most promising aspect of this new initiative
is the possibility of providing assistance in areas that the
United States is unwilling or unable to pursue. For
example, during one NSC meeting held in Spring 2001
as part of the Bush administration’s “strategic review,” a
Russian proposal to fund the dismantlement of general
purpose, nuclear-powered submarines was rejected. These
submarines, despite being nuclear powered, were essen-
tially considered a local Russian environmental prob-
lem and not a strategic proliferation threat. This NSC
decision was never fully publicized, and the idea remained
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important to the non-governmental, European, and Rus-
sian disarmament and nonproliferation communities. It
has now resurfaced in the G8 forum, obviously with U.S.
acceptance and perhaps with the hope that another G8
country would take up the effort. 30
As another example, the G8 Statement calls for the
partners to “develop and maintain appropriate effective
measures to account for and secure [WMD weapons and
materials].” One way to read this clause is that it is Russia’s
responsibility alone to develop and maintain the account-
ing. Given the context of this partnership, however, one
could interpret the clause to mean that there will be
bi- or multi-lateral measures developed. With the signing
of the Moscow Treaty, the United States and Russia
appear to have further postponed the resolution of long
contentious issues regarding transparency of warhead
stockpiles. By leveraging the multilateral aspect of the G8
Partnership, however, the participation of the G8 part-
ners in these discussions may allow a more compre-
hensive approach to such issues.
Russian Domestic Law
It has become apparent that the only long-term solution
to the transparency, taxation, and liability issues is a legal
one. The Russian government, preferably through the
passage of legislation in the Russian Federal Assembly,
should legitimize the threat reduction guidelines and prin-
ciples so that they carry the weight of domestic law.
Although a presidential decree does not carry the same
weight as legislative approval, it has been used effectively
in the past to establish national policy at least as an
interim measure. In either case, the legal authority should
be applicable at the federal, regional, and local levels. The
Russian government is currently seeking Federal Assem-
bly approval of the 1999 Protocols to the U.S.-Russian
Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement. Bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements for threat reduction efforts under the G8
Partnership would probably also benefit from endorsement
by the Russian Federal Assembly.
As a G8 leader, Russian President Putin will be
expected to comply with the statement’s content, and
therefore may be obligated to implement it in Russia. One
might speculate, therefore, that much of the statement
may be designed to either (1) provide President Putin with
internationally agreed language that helps him acquire
legislative endorsement from the Federal Assembly,
perhaps through ratification of international agreements,
or (2) to encourage him to issue a presidential decree that
carries sufficient legal weight. As U.S. Under Secretary
Bolton told the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions in October 2002: “For the new Global Partnership
to be successful, the Russian Federation will need to take
concrete actions to resolve outstanding problems.”31
For Russia’s Federal Assembly to consider seriously
ratification of new nonproliferation agreements, it may
require that two conditions be satisfied. First, the promise
of substantial new funding would facilitate acceptance of
the guidelines and principles established by the G8 State-
ment. It appears that this possibility may come to fruition
if the Canadian, European, and Japanese partners can
establish acceptable bilateral implementing agreements.
Second, the lack of reciprocity in terms of transparency
may hinder Federal Assembly approval. The simple vir-
tue of nonproliferation is unlikely to sway even the most
altruistic Russian legislator if it means that Western
nations will gain asymmetric access to sensitive Rus-
sian facilities. It will be incumbent on the donor states,
therefore, to establish a broader framework under which
Russia obtains the necessary reassurances to allow the
program to move forward.
Russian Funding and Absorption Capacities
The U.S. Nunn-Lugar program is partially designed around
Russia’s ability to fund its own dismantlement and WMD
security efforts and its ability to absorb infusions of
donated equipment and services. There is growing
evidence that Russia deliberately structures its annual
federal budget in the areas of demilitarization, arms dis-
mantlement, and proliferation prevention around expec-
tations of foreign assistance. Russia obviously contributes
considerable resources in the form of labor, wages, facili-
ties, real estate, equipment, training, and operations and
maintenance. In the area of CW destruction, in fact, Rus-
sia has greatly increased its budget allotments for the
Shchuchye site in order to meet U.S. Congressional
criticisms of the program’s slow rate of progress in
previous years.
At the same time, the Russian Munitions Agency
has had to fend off attacks on its budget from competing
Russian government agencies. The RMA director
reported to Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) officials
recently that his colleagues from other ministries sug-
gested that he does not need additional funding to
support CW destruction since the G8 was going to take
care of the problem.32
At a meeting between DoD CTR officials and
Russian Ministry of Defense officials in 2000, a senior
MOD official intimated that the CTR annual budget
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allocation for Russian nuclear warhead transportation and
storage security was greater than the entire MOD Twelfth
Main Directorate’s warhead security budget.33  In fact, the
CW elimination program approved by the Russian gov-
ernment in 2001 specifies that the Russian budget for this
effort will be adjusted annually to reflect the volume of
financial aid donated by state parties to the Chemical
Weapons Convention.34  Furthermore, Russia’s budget for
the implementation of arms control agreements has fallen
from $500 million-$600 million in 1996/1997 to $60 mil-
lion-$70 million in 1999/2000.35  NTI Vice President
Laura Holgate stated at an October 2002 U.S. Senate For-
eign Relations Committee hearing that this decline
“reflects the degree to which Russia’s threat reduction
plans are currently being structured in anticipation of the
other G8 nations meeting their $20 billion pledge.”36
The donor states under the G8 Global Partnership
will also need to consider Russia’s ability to absorb
increased technical assistance. Many of the weapon
elimination facilities in Russia are already operating
at full capacity. In many of Russia’s regions, a limited num-
ber of firms are capable of carrying out demilitarization
work, and many are already engaged through existing
programs. For example, in 1999, the U.S. DoD conducted
project planning meetings with the Russian MOD’s
Twelfth Main Directorate in Moscow to estimate the costs
of providing comprehensive security enhancements to
Russian nuclear warhead storage sites. MOD introduced
the DoD officials to a variety of local firms cleared to con-
duct the on-site work. However, MOD indicated that
there was really only one security-cleared firm available
in each region, each possessing limited personnel with
adequate technical skills.
Many of the Russian ministries that are recipients of
foreign nonproliferation aid have dedicated limited staffs
to coordination efforts with their foreign partners. From
the staff in the Russian Foreign Ministry who are autho-
rized to negotiate nonproliferation implementing agree-
ments, to the customs officials at the ports of entry where
donated equipment will arrive, to the construction crews
and technical personnel at the work sites, it is unclear
whether Russia can handle a large increase in foreign
assistance. To mitigate this potential bottleneck, it may
be possible for new initiatives to leverage existing projects.
For example, if the Europeans and Japanese were to
engage Russia on the dismantlement of the general pur-
pose submarines—as they have expressed a desire to do—
it might be advisable to utilize the U.S.-provided heavy
equipment already in place to dismantle Russia’s
strategic missile submarines. In the spirit of the G8 Glo-
bal Partnership, this type of coordination and burden-
sharing would extend the economies of scale for in-place
assistance and sustain the service contracts currently
enjoyed by Russia’s shipyards.
ANALYSIS OF SELECTED G8 GLOBAL
PARTNERSHIP CLAUSES
The G8 Statement contains several opening paragraphs
that frame the context and parameters of the initiative,
followed by six principles and nine guidelines intended
to facilitate implementation of the nonproliferation
assistance programs. The first paragraph clearly references
the threat of terrorism and the enhanced international
cooperation catalyzed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks as the
driving force behind the establishment of the partnership.
The second paragraph outlines the partnership’s general
goals and objectives, including a list of initial nonprolif-
eration priorities in Russia and a specific reference to the
debt-for-program financing option.
This section analyzes and comments on several of the
key clauses and phrases contained in the statement. Many
of these, as noted above, were drawn either directly from
the U.S.-NIS Nunn-Lugar agreements, or from the com-
mon experiences of the G8 partners in previous and
ongoing bilateral programs. In either case, the intent was
to provide uniform standards and opportunities for both
donor and recipient states.37
Principle 2: Develop and maintain appropriate effective
measures to account for and secure such items38  in produc-
tion, use, storage and domestic and international transport;
provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to
account for and secure these items.
Note the difference in the two clauses. While the
United States is in the process of supporting the latter
clause in Russia, it is somewhat surprising that Russia
allowed the first clause to remain in the statement. Rus-
sian officials usually insist that WMD materials are
adequately secured. It is certainly possible that Russia did
object to the clause, but let it stand in return for a conces-
sion elsewhere. Of course, one way to read the first clause
is that it is Russia’s responsibility alone to develop and
maintain a system of accounting. But given the context
of this partnership, one could interpret the first clause to
mean that there will be bi- or multilateral measures
developed. This clause may be designed either to (1) pro-
vide President Putin with internationally agreed language
that helps him acquire legislative approval from the
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Russian Federal Assembly for a warhead counting regime
(or to support his efforts to meet the CWC and Biological
Weapons Convention [BWC] provisions), or (2) encour-
age him to issue a presidential decree that carries suffi-
cient legal weight.
Principles 4 & 5: border controls versus export and trans-
shipment controls
The former clause refers to technical assistance, such
as guns, guard training, and X-ray machines. The latter
phrase refers to legal and administrative arrangements and
procedures. Russia requires assistance with both.
Guideline i. Mutually agreed effective monitoring,
auditing and transparency measures and procedures will be
required in order to ensure that cooperative activities meet
agreed objectives (including irreversibility as necessary),
to confirm work performance, to account for the funds
expended and to provide for adequate access for donor repre-
sentatives to work sites.
The phrases “auditing” and “account for the funds
expended” can be traced directly back to the Nunn-Lugar
umbrella agreements and specific “audit and examination”
language included in all DoD CTR implementing agree-
ments. This provision has worked well in CTR, for the
most part, and remains an important element of the pro-
gram. Not only does it provide assurances to the U.S.
Congress that the assistance is being used for its intended
purposes, but the audit trips also serve as a project man-
agement tool to perform such functions as observing the
project’s effectiveness and learning what items need
maintenance.
In contrast, the phrases “monitoring,” “transparency
measures,” and “adequate access for donor representatives
to work sites” are new to this relationship. They are obvi-
ously intended to fill the holes that have caused so many
problems with the existing programs. In particular, U.S.
access to the work sites, or lack thereof, is a key driver of
the success or failure of several core elements of DoD’s
Russian nuclear warhead security program and DOE’s
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)
program.
It has become apparent that the only solution to the
access/transparency issue is a legal one. Therefore, as with
other clauses in the statement, it may be designed either
to (1) provide President Putin with internationally agreed
language that helps him gain legislative endorsement from
the Russian Federal Assembly, perhaps through ratifica-
tion approval, or (2) encourage him to issue a presiden-
tial decree that carries sufficient legal weight to resolve
the transparency issue.
Guideline iii. Clearly defined milestones will be devel-
oped for each project, including the option of suspending or
terminating a project if the milestones are not met.
The U.S. has had difficulty in the past defining exit
criteria for contemplated or existing projects. Moreover,
the United States has had bad experiences with Russia
withdrawing promised support for construction projects,
forcing the United States to add additional funding.
Therefore, this clause possibly is meant to help the par-
ties build credible exit criteria into new projects.
There is at least one challenge, though. Will the
donor states be willing to endure the domestic political
fallout of abandoning half-completed projects? Several
large Nunn-Lugar projects evolved with Russian prom-
ises of substantial contributions. However, in every case,
the Russian funding dissipated, leaving the U.S. with two
options: double its assistance or walk away with nothing
to show for tens—and even hundreds—of millions of dol-
lars in sunk costs. In every case, the U.S. chose to increase
its assistance.
For example, in 1992 and 1993 DoD entered into two
agreements with Minatom to design and construct the
Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility. DoD and Minatom
reached an understanding that each side would contrib-
ute roughly half of the total funding to construct the
facility. In 1995, a comprehensive assessment estimated
the total cost at $516 million to complete a two-wing
facility that could store 50,000 containers of fissile mate-
rial. For a time, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin personally monitored progress on this
project. However, after substantial U.S. investment and
construction progress, Minatom announced that it would
not be able to fulfill its half of the financial contribution.
The United States nonetheless continued work on the
project. The currently estimated U.S. cost to complete just
the first wing, housing 25,000 containers, is approximately
$388 million. This amount would have been even higher
were it not for the cost savings realized from the devalua-
tion of the ruble following the 1998 financial crisis.39
Likewise, in accordance with a 1995 agreement, the
initial plans to provide security enhancements to the
Russian Ministry of Defense nuclear weapon storage sites
were based on a sharing of resource contributions. At a
meeting in 1996, the two sides concurred on an approach
whereby DoD would procure the physical security equip-
ment, and Russia would ship and install the equipment at
its sensitive sites. As late as 1998, the DoD budget to pur-
chase equipment for site security enhancements at 50
Russian national stockpile sites totaled approximately
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$225 million. By 2001, that budget had increased to well
over $600 million for two reasons. First, MOD had added
73 operational-level warhead storage sites at Russian Air
Force, Navy, and Strategic Rocket Forces bases to the list
of sites to be upgraded. But more significantly, DoD had
added shipping, site design, facility renovation and site
preparation, and equipment installation to its budget.
Since many of the operational-level storage sites may be
closed under START I, they are scheduled to receive only
the relatively inexpensive perimeter security systems and
not the comprehensive security upgrades. Therefore, the
bulk of the U.S. budget increase represents an assumption
of originally Russian responsibilities.40
As these cases suggest, donor states participating in
the G8 Global Partnership should be prepared to main-
tain funding control over the critical path parts of each
project in order to ensure their eventual completion.
Guideline ix. Measures will be put in place to ensure
effective protection of sensitive information and intellec-
tual property.
Last year, the U.S. put in place a law that strengthens
the government’s ability to protect information provided
by foreign governments and designated by the originat-
ing government as sensitive.41  In effect, the U.S. is legally
bound to protect foreign government information at the
classification level determined by the foreign government.
DoD is using this law as the basis of a protocol with
Minatom to exchange sensitive information. DoD has
proposed to do the same with the Russian MOD, but
MOD has intimated that it may prefer not to have a
paper agreement.
In any case, the existence of the U.S. Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) concerns the Russians. The
sharpest example is the declassification in the late-1990s
of satellite imagery taken in the 1960s under the Corona
program. The declassified imagery included hundreds of
photos of Russian nuclear warhead storage sites. During
several CTR program manager meetings, senior MOD
officials strongly chastised DoD for this release, noting
that the current sites are the same sites photographed
thirty years prior. Essentially, Russia remains unconvinced
that the United States will protect sensitive information
that might be shared as part of cooperative nonprolifera-
tion projects. The declassified U.S. satellite imagery, for
instance, released at a time when the United States was
proposing that Russia provide greater information about
the location and condition of its nuclear weapon storage
sites, may have set back the CTR nuclear warhead stor-
age security program by 2 to 3 years. Russian concerns
will need to be addressed if projects requiring sharing of
sensitive information are to move forward expeditiously.
Ingredients for G8 Partnership Success
All parties to the partnership should recognize that it will
take a concerted effort to enhance the G8 initiative’s pros-
pects for large-scale success. This new partnership will
help prevent proliferation both politically, by further
integrating Russia into the international community, and
functionally, by further eliminating excess WMD and
missiles in Russia and the NIS.
The following outlines several measures necessary to
ensure the success of the G8 Partnership. Based on the
U.S. experience, the items listed below are intended to
build on what has worked well and to mitigate what has
worked less well. These recommendations are based on
an assessment of the historical record of both U.S. and
multilateral nonproliferation programs.
Individual projects should be bilateral. Discrete,
niche projects that one donor country can fully fund
under a well-defined, finite implementing agreement with
a specific Russian recipient agency will have the greatest
chance of successful implementation. As described else-
where in this report, individual projects, negotiated by one
donor and one recipient, and with focused objectives, have
been historically simpler to negotiate and complete. Many
of the partners, in fact, have bilateral projects either
ongoing or planned. For example, the United States, Brit-
ain, and France all provided supercontainers designed to
hold nuclear warheads inside railcars. The Russians
avoided duplication—and the United States, Britain, and
France coordinated among themselves—by requesting
different sized containers from each donor. The French,
for example, built containers much larger than the Ameri-
can version. Russia uses the French version to haul heavy
warheads, presumably removed from SS-18 intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles. As noted above, these types of
projects were successful in part since each donor state
undertook a discrete endeavor it could support that
needed little multilateral coordination. It appears that this
point remains fundamental to U.S. policy. As U.S. Under
Secretary of State Bolton has noted, “We do not intend
to establish a Global Partnership multilateral imple-
mentation mechanism or common fund. However,
the G8 Senior Officials, as the coordinating mechanism,
will address priorities, identify program gaps, and prevent
duplication and overlap.”42  However, according another
State Department official who was involved in the nego-
tiations to draft the G8 Statement, there will also be a
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concerted effort within the NSSG to develop collabora-
tive, multilateral projects.43
Coordination by the NSSG should be authoritative
but limited. The White House fact sheet on the G8
Global Partnership notes that, “The G8 will establish a
senior-level mechanism to coordinate partnership activi-
ties, including monitoring progress and considering project
priorities and opportunities.”44  The G8 oversight body
should limit itself (1) to ensuring adherence to the G8
Partnership principles, and (2) to prevent duplicative or
counterproductive efforts. More specifically, the NSSG
should be proactive. Partner representatives to the com-
mittee should actively acquire information on what their
governments are doing and planning. It should also rec-
ognize the fact that different member countries will
negotiate unique bilateral agreements with Russia and the
other recipient states, due to the peculiar needs of each.
However, the oversight body should strive to ensure that
all agreements closely conform to the principles and guide-
lines, and that no bilateral agreement has detrimental
affects on another member’s bilateral agreement or
negotiations. All donors should receive equal treatment,
and Russia should receive equal treatment from all
donors. The NSSG may facilitate this by helping to main-
tain consistent implementation policies among the G8
donors, as described below. Nonetheless, the NSSG should
not be used as a tool to influence national nonprolifera-
tion strategies. Moreover, the G8 partners should resist
any temptations to use the NSSG to micromanage spe-
cific bilateral or multilateral threat reduction projects.
These actions would adversely affect the NSSG’s effec-
tiveness, add additional bureaucratic hurdles, and under-
mine the partnership’s legitimacy among both the G7
donors and within Russia.
Russian consent ideally should be in the form of
legislation approved by the Russian Federal Assembly,
although a presidential decree may be sufficient. The
Russian government should legitimize the threat reduc-
tion guidelines and principles so that they carry the weight
of domestic law. This is the one action that the Russian
Federation can take to uphold its commitment to coop-
erative threat reduction, which would require no Russian
funding and would have the greatest positive effect. The
donor states of the G8 should strive through diplomacy
to achieve Russian legislative approval of the G8 prin-
ciples and guidelines, although it may not be politically
realistic. Perhaps the most the G8 can hope for is to use
the principles as a baseline from which the sides can
negotiate bilateral assistance agreements and protocols
with Russia. However, on July 23, 2002, the Russian gov-
ernment issued Instruction Number KA-P4-10775, which
specifies that the U.S.-Russian Nunn-Lugar umbrella
agreement temporarily will be applied in full scope until
Russia ratifies the 1999 protocol (which extended the
agreement and provides for other provisions). This break-
through may offer a precedent on which the G8 might
build. As noted by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation John Wolf, “Unless Russia is prepared
to implement the Guidelines, then this thing’s going to
be stillborn.”45
Implementation policies among the G8 donors
should be consistent. Perhaps through the limited over-
sight of the NNSG, Russian recipient agencies should be
precluded from shopping for the best deal among the
G8 donors. Past experience under the U.S. Nunn-Lugar
program suggests that elements of the Russian government
are adept at pursuing avenues most suitable to their
own purposes. One programmatic area in particular has
had enough overlap to be an issue: warhead security. Ini-
tially, this task fell strictly under DoD’s CTR program.
However, due to the perceived success of the DOE
MPC&A program with the Russian Navy and problems
with certifying46  Russia to receive CTR assistance from
DoD, DOE was able to expand its efforts to include Rus-
sian Navy warhead security enhancements. DOE’s mis-
sion recently crept over to the Russian Strategic Rocket
Forces, and there has been talk of DOE work at Russian
Air Force sites. While most agree that it does not matter
which U.S. agency—or even which country, for that
matter—conducts the work, as long as the objectives are
accomplished, these developments have caused bureau-
cratic turf battles and duplicative budgets. At the same
time, one can hardly blame Russia for pursuing the
avenue that will provide the most assistance with the least
intrusiveness. This example is not intended as a call for
the G8 to coordinate within countries and not just
between them. Rather, it is meant to warn of the diffi-
culties of effective oversight and the dangers of not care-
fully delineating responsibilities.
The U.S. needs to exercise leadership. The Euro-
pean states and Japan, at times, have requested that the
United States suggest areas where they could provide
threat reduction assistance and have requested the U.S.
government’s concurrence on plans developed with
anticipated NIS recipients. Examples cited above include:
the procurement of warhead supercontainers, the construc-
tion of the Mayak FMSF, the construction of the
Shchuch’ye CWDF, and the science and technology
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centers. Some discrete projects, such as British and Scan-
dinavian efforts to deal with the radioactive contamina-
tion on Russia’s Kola Peninsula, are possible without
multilateral interaction. Experience indicates, however,
that many projects will require U.S. leadership as the part-
ner with the largest and most comprehensive coopera-
tive nonproliferation program.
EU, Canadian, and Japanese assistance should
complete the puzzle. The G8 partners should use the
newly committed European, Canadian, and Japanese fund-
ing to complement the existing U.S. Nunn-Lugar program.
For example, Germany’s support for the retraining and
resettlement of Soviet military personnel stationed in the
former East Germany filled a gap long desired by Russia,
but which went unfulfilled by Nunn-Lugar assistance due
to restrictions imposed by the U.S. Congress. One impor-
tant area for future coordinated G8 support entails Euro-
pean, Canadian, and Japanese funding for the operations
and maintenance of projects initiated or completed
under U.S. funding. While such efforts may not generate
the positive publicity of initiating new projects, ensuring
ongoing operations and maintenance support may be the
best way to sustain the concrete successes of the Nunn-
Lugar programs.
EU, Canadian, and Japanese assistance should also
expand the puzzle. The G8 partners should use the newly
committed European, Canadian, and Japanese funding to
supplement the existing U.S. Nunn-Lugar program by pro-
viding assistance for areas into which the U.S. is either
unwilling or unable to expand. In this context, Partner-
ship monies might in particular be leveraged for projects
of direct concern to the Europeans and Japanese, such as
dismantling tactical nuclear weapon delivery systems and
nuclear-powered attack submarines. By expanding the
types of projects to be addressed, the G8 Global Part-
nership will enhance its impact on the universe of
proliferation threats.
NATO-derived standardization processes should be
applied. The U.S. and its NATO partners have long-
established procedures to coordinate multilateral weapon
and communication system design, development, test-
ing, and acquisition. Of the G7 countries—the United
States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and
Japan—only Japan is not a member of NATO. By apply-
ing these procedures to standardize equipment assistance
destined for Russia, NATO-derived processes can lead the
G8 away from the problems encountered by the emer-
gency response program described above and toward a more
consistent overall threat reduction effort. Without
some effort to standardize equipment and procedures,
local and regional guard forces for WMD-related facili-
ties in Russia may receive radios that will not communi-
cate with each other, various Russian agencies may receive
proliferation response training containing procedural con-
flicts, or facilities may be built in Russia that receive
incompatible equipment from different donor partners.
NATO-derived standardization skills may be most effec-
tively applied within the NSSG. However, the NATO
members of the G8 should take care to utilize the multi-
lateral program management skills developed through its
NATO experience and avoid giving the impression that
the G8 Partnership is a NATO program.
CONCLUSIONS
The multilateralization of the Nunn-Lugar cooperative
security model is an important and significant step in the
global effort to reduce the threat of WMD proliferation.
By forming the G8 Global Partnership, the G8 members
have committed to sustaining and expanding the effort
led by the U.S. since 1991. While the terrorist attacks on
the United States on September 11, 2001, played a sig-
nificant role in altering both the U.S.-Russian relation-
ship and the state of global affairs, the event should not
be overemphasized in the nonproliferation effort. This is
a long-term challenge that requires comprehensive and
sustained solutions. Each of the partners, including
Russia, must do its part to make the G8 initiative a
success.
Even where few policy barriers exist, practical mat-
ters often disrupt efficient project management. In par-
ticular, tax and liability exemptions frequently prompt
international disputes and project delays. It is entirely
possible that President Putin will use the G8 Statement
as a basis for gaining legislative endorsement of the
cooperative threat reduction effort. By obtaining Fed-
eral Assembly approval of the U.S.-Russia umbrella agree-
ment, or perhaps by writing a new law that covers all G8
Partnership programs, Russia would eliminate substantial
roadblocks to effective and efficient implementation.
While not glamorous, it is one of the most important con-
crete steps Russia can contribute to the cooperative
effort.
By the next G8 Summit at the beginning of June 2003
in Evian, France, the United States will press its Euro-
pean, Canadian, and Japanese Partners to commit their
half of the $20 billion goal.47  As NTI Vice President
Holgate told the U.S. Senate in October 2002:
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We have seen some early initiative from G8 nations to
honor their pledges, but all member nations have much
more to do to meet the high expectations they created
with their bold statements at Kananaskis. G8 nations
have given themselves and the world a fleeting oppor-
tunity to truly transform threat reduction efforts. The
stability of a $20 billion commitment over the next
decade creates an entirely new fiscal environment for
such activities, and the multilateral nature of the “Glo-
bal Partnership” affords new opportunities for collabo-
ration and synergy, in which the whole really is greater
than the sum of its parts.48
One of the often overlooked intangible benefits of
threat reduction cooperation is the relationship-building
that occurs among professional military officers, among
professional bureaucrats, between scientific communities,
and across the industrial and private sectors. Too often,
managers, decision makers, and legislators in the threat
reduction cooperation business focus exclusively on the
scorecard of dismantled weapon systems. Equally impor-
tant are the day-to-day working relationships that develop
between participants, who learn how the other side thinks,
come to understand why the other side conducts business
in particular ways, and gain insight into the decision-
making processes of the partners. As opposed to formal
arms control treaties, which are concluded through dis-
tant and diplomatic means under the presumption of an
adversarial relationship, threat reduction cooperation
requires on-the-ground engagement. Bureaucrats, mili-
tary officers, scientists, and business employees work
together to solve security objectives. Progress is then made
through a collaborative learning process. These exchanges
effect cultural stereotypes on both sides and build another
level of trust and understanding among influential
experts.49
Each current and future state party to the G8 Global
Partnership shares the nonproliferation commitment. At
the same time, each state party brings a unique perspec-
tive and set of experiences to the group. Americans,
Europeans, Canadians, and Japanese may wish to focus
on different aspects of the proliferation problem, and
each will be in a distinct geographical, political, and
financial position to do so. Russians will have their own
priorities, which should be considered and respected.
It seems unlikely that the general goals and objectives that
each partner brings, though, will be contradictory. It will
therefore be incumbent on the G8 as the coordinating
body to ensure that the projects selected for implemen-
tation are complementary, are mutually beneficial, and
enhance the nonproliferation objective.
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